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This paper examines recent criticisms of non government 
organisations (NGOs) intervening in complex emergencies 
(ie, conflict-driven emergencies). It argues that humanitarian 
NGOs should develop their mandates to make the recognition 
and realisation of human rights their uppermost aim, focusing 
initially on the 'positive' rights of the International Charter on 
Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 
Calling for the adoption of a human rights framework for 
humanitarian interventions by NGOs may be considered 
impractical and inappropriate given the voluntary nature of 
NGOs and their status as charities. But it is time NGOs 
transcend philanthropy and recognise their responsibilities 
in terms of internationally recognised standards. Charity is 
an inadequate basis for humanitarian action and should not 
be carried into the next century. 
There is nothing wrong with the heartfelt response which 
underlies true charity, but we must go further and recognise 
the right of the poor and vulnerable to international assistance. 
While religiously-based NGOs understand this as a rationale 
for their activities, here it is understood as a secular recognition 
of rights as formulated in international human rights law, 
particularly in the International Charter on Civil and Political 
Rights and the covenant referred to above. 
Many NGOs do refer to rights in their mandates or 
programmes, but rights such as 'basic rights' are weaker 
formulations and have no basis in international law. The fact 
is, internationally recognised human rights are the most 
coherent and forceful expression of humanitarian ideals 
available - they transcend philanthropy. Why not base 
mandates and programmes on them? They set standards that 
can be estimated and debated by both the intervening NGO 
and the group or community concerned, thus inviting dialogue. 
Critique of the political economists 
North-South relations: A number of recent papers and 
reports have been critical of humanitarian responses to 
complex political emergencies. NGO interventions in 
southern Sudan and Rwanda have received particular 
attention. Criticism has come from academics (mainly 
political economists), human rights commentators (notably 
African Rights), campaigners for peace (including the Center 
of Concern in Washington), within some European NGOs 
and in the form of independent evaluations (in particular the 
recent Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda). 
Although critiques ofNGO intervention have generally been 
made with the luxury of detachment from the responsibility 
of responding to emergencies and implementing recovery 
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programmes, many of the arguments are partly true and NGOs 
can learn from them. 
Critiques have commonly been written from a global political 
perspective in which the North is not commited to resolving 
political crisis or war in the South, or to financing the 
economic rehabilitation required for political stability. In 
effect, this abandons the South to a form of separate 
development (ie, apartheid). In this setting of disengagement, 
humanitarian aid has become 'the principal means of political 
crisis management in a now marginal South' (Duffield 
1994:7), and international NGOs and organisations like the 
International Committee of the Red Cross have become 'the 
proxy means of maintaining aid flows' (Macrae and Zwi 
1994:28). This failure manifested itself recently in Rwanda, 
where 'humanitarian action substituted for political action' 
(Eriksson et al. 1996:11 ). 
The role of NGOs: NGOs cannot fill the void created by 
political disengagement. NGO mandates generally limit them 
to apolitical activities. Even ifNGOs adopted a more political 
role they lack the expertise for the task; how would they be 
coordinated, for example, and what form of public 
accountability would keep them in check (see Prendergast 
1995; de Waal 1994)? Moreover, it is difficult for NGOs to 
act in the international political arena since they lack an 
identity in international law. NGO mandates are not founded 
on international agreements, unlike the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent movement or international agencies like the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Although NGOs cannot take the lead in political engagement 
it is important for them to adopt a human rights framework, 
with or without a ready basis in international law. This is 
important for its own sake (transcending philanthropy), but it 
is also a vital foundation for a more coordinated rights-based 
approach to complex emergencies. Internationally recognised 
human rights provide the basis for common objectives and 
the space within which NGOs can negotiate discrete 
responsibilities. This is not to say that UN agencies should 
necessarily have the final word on NGO roles. Roles and 
responses would continue to be debated, but with reference 
to one set of overriding principles: human rights. 
It is not just a matter of principle. It is important in terms of 
the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian 
responses. In the context of Rwanda, Oxfam's Emergencies 
Coordinator Nick Stockton (1995) has argued that the 
proliferation ofNGOs intervening in humanitarian crises, with 
no internationally mandated responsibilities, has eroded 
accountability and compromised effectiveness. 
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Manipulation of humanitarian assistance: Critics ofNGO 
responses to complex emergencies also argue that because 
NGOs have no mandate or ability to tackle the underlying 
political causes of conflict, they have become part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution. Duffield (1995: 1) 
argues that humanitarian assistance has become 'incorporated 
into the fabric of protracted crisis.' Similarly, de Waal 
(1994:3) concludes that 'relief aid delivered by international 
agencies has become integrated into processes of violence 
and oppression,' and in Sudan specifically 'relief is prolonging 
the war' (1994:13). Part of the probkm is that many NGOs 
lack the capacity to see the big picture or to analyse the root 
political causes of complex emergencies. This must be the 
case for NGOs that channel funds to emergencies through 
others and have no operational involvement themselves. 
It has also been argued that NGOs are compromised with 
respect to human rights. NGOs face dilemmas when providing 
relief in cooperation with those in authority, who are suspected 
or known to be engaged in human rights abuses. This is a 
common problem in complex emergencies - deals have to be 
struck with the combatants just to operate. This was at its 
starkest in Somalia, where cases of money were handed over 
just to land planes and move relief around Mogadishu. NGOs 
have to recognise that in some instances relief assistance 
strengthens the hand of those who are driving the conflict, 
thereby making people more vulnerable in the most 
elementary sense. 
In such circumstances, NGOs concentrate on their project -
be it a feeding centre, health clinic or well digging programme 
- and do their best to deal with the problems that threaten to 
engulf them. In themselves these interventions are likely to 
be very valuable, but NGOs need to be mindful of one of the 
basic laws of complex emergencies: humanitarian assistance 
tends to be subverted when it is provided in cooperation with 
parties to a conflict. It is naive to believe that Captain so-
and-so from the government, rebel or faction army can run 
two agendas -war and humanitarian relief. While some might 
try to create a space for humanitarian action, the prosecution 
of their struggle is the only reality and assistance will be used 
(where possible) in pursuit of war. Moreover, war is anarchic; 
relief supplies are gold and much of it will be looted, whether 
directly from NGOs or from those it is distributed to. 
Political naivete: IfNGOs are unable to grasp the symbiosis 
between relief and war, critics argue it is because NGOs have 
a poor understanding of complex political emergencies. That 
is, NGOs are more orless ignorant of what Duffield (1995:1) 
terms 'the operation of the internal sociopolitical dynamic of 
a protracted crisis.' It is also argued that the developmental 
ideas NGOs apply to their programmes are inadequate because 
they lack a sociopolitical framework in which to analyse 
political crisis and conflict. NGOs are advised, in effect, to 
put their neutral, safe development philosophy back on the 
shelf and examine the hard political and human rights issues 
involved in complex emergencies instead. Some NGOs may 
be willing to take this criticism on board, but the problem for 
NGOs far from the conflict is: who will assist them to make 
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this analysis? Can Australian NGOs rely on their international 
partners to do so? 
Advocacy and criticism of combatants: It has been suggested 
that NGOs should do more to protect people's rights and be 
less concerned about jeopardising their projects. Duffield, 
Macrae and Zwi (1994:228) observe generally: 
While the international relief system has readily taken 
on a role in the provision of physical resources, it has 
been less active in developing strategies concerned 
for the protection of conflict-affected communities. 
NGOs and other operational agencies, such as 
UNHCR, have often been reluctant to speak out openly 
about human rights abuses, of which they often have 
direct evidence. The advocacy role of NGOs is 
frequently underplayed in favour of operational 
activities, despite, or perhaps because of, their often 
close relationship with bilateral and multilateral donor 
communities. The independence of many NGOs has 
thus become sacrificed to the wider international need 
to be seen to respond to humanitarian crises in an 
apparently 'neutral', apolitical way. 
In the case of southern Sudan, the team reviewing the Sudan 
Emergency Operations Consortium (Duffield et al. 1995:226) 
noted that advocacy, especially public pronouncements, had 
long been a sensitive issue among NGOs: 
For the sake of maintaining a presence, many have 
chosen silence. If anything, negotiated access has 
made this problem even more sensitive. Once access 
has been granted and accepted, it is not easy to 
maintain a critical independence. A significant part 
of advocacy within a negotiated programme therefore, 
frequently takes a less contentious form. That is, non 
partisan support for the often long-running peace 
process. 
Some NGOs working in complex emergencies have supported 
advocacy at the institutional and international level; that is, 
by lobbying parties in the peace process. But NGOs generally 
refrain from issuing press releases criticising the warring 
parties and criticism is kept to private consultations and 
briefings for fear of expulsion. The NGOs concerned tend to 
place a higher value on their continued presence. After all, if 
an NGO cannot deliver its assistance and implement its 
projects it is no longer a player (and will be left with unspent 
funds). So NGOs tend to stay, rationalising that it is important 
that they remain as a moderating influence and as witness, 
and to gain information on which to base external 
advocacy. But one has to ask: at what point should NGOs 
regard the situation as intolerable and speak out about 
human rights? 
I am reminded of the dilemma faced by Save the Children 
Fund (UK) in Uganda in 1984. We were aware that atrocities 
were being commited in the Luwero triangle north of Kampala 
-bodies were being dumped close to the roads. We stayed on 
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as witnesses, delivering relief and medical supplies and 
passing on information to the British High Commissioner. It 
was later said that the High Commissioner failed to pass this 
information on to the Foreign Office. Whether he did or not 
it was naive of us to expect any action from the British 
government when they were fully commited to Milton Obote. 
With the wisdom of hindsight it seems we should have 
sacrificed our presence and campaigned against the ruthless 
practices of both Obote and Museveni's forces. It would have 
led to the expulsion of Save the Children Fund (UK) and the 
loss of assets, but we were doing little good in Luwero. 
Indeed, it could be argued we did considerable harm by 
attracting people to relief centres where they became prey to 
government soldiers. Many men were murdered and many 
women were raped in the relief camps, and we were powerless 
to stop it. 
This is not to say that NGOs have no role to play as a 
moderating influence or witness. The presence ofNGOs can 
inhibit combatants, and material relief can help people in areas 
hit by conflict to remain in their homes or plant their next 
crop. This is vital to stem the tide of displacement that typifies 
conflict. The difficulty comes in balancing this role with 
responsibilities for human rights. A point will be reached 
where an NGO will have to raise human rights issues and by 
doing so put their continued presence in jeopardy. 
This is where coordination between mandated agencies and 
NGOs is vital. It is as simple as 'united we stand and divided 
we fall.' Together, on the basis of a shared commitment to 
human rights, some attempt must be made in complex 
emergencies to impose a bottom line in terms of human rights. 
Individual NGOs should not be left to 'go it alone' in this 
respect. 
Developing a sociopolitical framework: Another substantial 
criticism levelled at NGOs is that they allow themselves to 
remain politically ignorant of the circumstances in which they 
operate (see Duffield 1995; de Waal 1994). It is true that 
NGOs have only a sketchy idea of the conflicts they become 
involved in and that they are largely ignorant of the precise 
dynamics of each situation. Keen and Wilson (1994:209-1 0) 
argue that NGOs should closely examine the relationship 
between relief and the local political economy, and the ability 
of different groups to pursue their own economic and military 
strategies: 
What is urgently required is a better understanding of 
the complex web of political and economic goals 
which together determine patterns of famine and relief 
during civil wars. These will include strategies for 
political and military control and for profit. They will 
also include strategies for survival and attempts either 
to maintain livelihoods or to develop new ones. 
Organisations involved in international relief need to 
think about how they are responding to the dynamics 
of conflict, about which strategies they should be 
facilitating, and which they should be discouraging. 
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Having established a basic sociopolitical frame of reference 
to inform programming, NGOs should try to comprehend what 
alternatives might emerge to existing sociopolitical structures 
if only· to sharpen their understanding of the dynamics of 
change. IfNGOs do not become versed in these areas, they 
run the risk of continuing to be manipulated into tolerating 
compromises which serve to maintain inequalities and 
conflict. NGOs must develop more critical political 
faculties. 
Accountability and effectiveness: There is much to be said 
about accountability and effectiveness and NGOs are under 
increasing pressure to demonstrate their capacity in these 
areas. Slim and Penrose (1994:205) observe that: 
A persistent feature of humanitarian assistance in 
recent years has been the lack of a transparent system 
of evaluation and accountability of the international 
community's response to emergencies. 
If most emergency operations were laid bare, so all could see 
the weaknesses of UN agencies and NGOs, the public would 
lose confidence and it would take some time to explain why 
things are as they are. Rwanda was chaotic. It is in our 
interests that such chaos be revealed since it will lead to 
improvements. Furthermore, there should be more attention 
to the evaluation of responses to complex emergencies. 
An often forgotten level of accountability is that owed to the 
gmups and communities 'targeted' for assistance. Feedback 
from the people most directly concerned is generally missing, 
depriving us of the ultimate reality check. 
Talking human rights 
Mandate to intervene: The international community has a 
mandate to intervene in humanitarian crises. Strictly speaking, 
intervention should be in pursuance of the fulfilment of the 
human rights spelt out in international agreements. The right 
to intervene only flows from these rights, it does not exist for 
other purposes. 
Sovereignty has generally been the obstacle to intervention 
on behalf of people's rights, hence the emergence of operations 
based on negotiated access such as Operation Lifeline Sudan. 
Sovereignty has been overridden several times by the Security 
Council, commencing with the humanitarian operation in 
northern Iraq, but the Security Council appears to act in 
circumstances where the United States and its allies perceive 
a strategic interest. Where there is no such interest, people 
are left to the jaws of sovereignty. For example, the 
international community should be more interventionist in 
securing access to the Nuba Mountains in Sudan to stop the 
attempted genocide of the Nuba people. There is a very 
strong argument in international law for unilateral 
international intervention in this case. NGOs concerned 
about situations such as the Nuba Mountains should found 
their claim (on behalf of the people concerned) on 
international human rights law. 
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One of the criticisms of international intervention is that too 
much emphasis has been placed on the right to conduct 
operations and protecting UN/NGO personnel, and not on 
protecting nationals from the conflict - let alone unravelling 
it. This is a complex issue, but the international community 
has been terribly ineffective in a number of recent 
emergencies, most notably in Rwanda. Foreigners were 
swiftly evacuated, but not many Rwandans were saved from 
the interahamwe militias. 
Founding humanitarian assistance on human rights: There 
is a direct causal link between human rights abuses and 
humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid is not 
currently founded on the rights of affected people and 
responses are limited to assistance. Redress and protection 
are rarely offered. These are underlying weaknesses of 
humanitarian aid as it now operates (see Tomasevski 1994; 
Slim and Penrose 1994; Human Rights Council of Australia 
1994). 
Humanitarian assistance can be strengthened by developing 
a sharper human rights focus, and NGOs should overhaul 
their mandates and adopt a human rights frame of reference. 
NGOs currently rely on a variety of inadequately defined 
ideals. Human rights would be a unifying principle between 
humanitarian actors and it would provide a coherent language 
and strong basis for advocacy (including advocacy directed 
at UN agencies). 
This would not mean that all NGOs adopt an Amnesty 
International framework. Amnesty is concerned with a narrow 
range of human rights concerns: the protective or 'negative' 
rights of the International Charter on Civil and Political Rights. 
NGOs which currently describe themselves as 'humanitarian' 
rather than 'human rights' organisations would focus instead 
on the 'positive' rights of the International Charter on Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights (eg, the right to food, health 
and shelter). It is significant that Amnesty now recognises 
the need to broaden its mandate into the 'positive' rights realm. 
In some ways Amnesty's success in highlighting the protective 
rights of the civil and political charter has narrowed the 
public's perception of human rights to the exclusion of the 
broader positive rights that underpin the 'right to 
development'. 
If NGOs cannot change their mandate in the way 
recommended, changes are surely possible at other levels. In 
terms of strategic planning, NGOs can embrace human rights 
instead of half-hearted 'basic rights'. At the field level NGOs 
can develop an 'entitlement theory' to provide the link 
between their humanitarian response and the rights of the 
individuals, groups and communities 'targeted'. With respect 
to the latter, it is important to give people actual undertakings 
regarding project outcomes and to establish some machinery 
whereby NGO performance can be challenged ( eg, through 
joint project steering committees). In terms ofthe orientation 
of staff, NGOs should encourage a more reflective and critical 
ethic rather than expect staff to internalise doubts, and foster 
a greater sense of responsibility towards those in. whose 
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name the NGO acts - be they refugees, displaced people 
or children. 
One problem NGOs face in developing mandates which 
embrace human rights is a lack of status in international law. 
NGOs operate outside this framework and are, in this sense, 
'non mandated' organisations. NGOs are not formally 
responsible for human rights. The governing boards ofNGOs 
can amend the NGO's mandate, but there will be no 
mechanism by which they can be held accountable under 
international law. Perhaps this does not matter. In practice 
accountability is sometimes lacking with the mandated 
agencies as well. Being founded on an international agreement 
does not in itself guarantee accountability to the public or to 
beneficiaries for humanitarian interventions. Even though a 
reasonable framework for human rights in international 
conventions has been achieved, responses are frequently 
driven by the narrow interests of the countries intervening. 
By talking human rights NGOs may be able to contribute to 
bringing the mandated agencies back on track. 
Another of the many difficulties that lie ahead is securing 
official donor support. The bottom line is that donors do not 
want to accept the financial obligation that would flow from 
the recognition of rights (Macrae and Zwi 1994 ). Assistance, 
as it is currently structured, leaves the donor in control. Rights 
are a different matter and would give validity to demands. 
NGOs and international law: NGOs have no formal human 
rights responsibilities since they have not been party to any 
of the agreements that make up international human rights 
law. NGO mandates are not founded on international 
instruments, unlike the International Committee of the Red 
Cross for example. Nor do NGOs have any formal obligations 
to the people of the countries where they work, and no 
contracts are signed to create them. Many do, of course, 
express moral accountability to beneficiaries and counterparts. 
NGOs are private voluntary organisations founded on 
charitable purposes. In Australia there is no formal restriction 
on political activity (unlike in the UK where charity law 
restricts NGOs to apolitical activities). The ethos of NGOs 
tends towards social justice and this is frequently translated 
into support for 'basic rights', apparently intending to 
incorporate both civil and political rights as well as social 
and economic rights (although the definition given for 'basic 
rights' is actually narrower than the content of the international 
instruments). 
Introducing the term 'basic rights' in the place of human rights 
is a retrograde step, whatever the content of the term. Human 
rights clearly refer to international agreements and obligations, 
'basic rights' do not. NGOs could found their work on human 
rights without taking on all the responsibilities this might entail 
by stating that their human rights work will be limited to 
activities directly linked, for example, to the relief of poverty, 
distress or suffering. In this way, mandates specific to each 
NGO could be maintained and carried into the human rights 
framework (eg, a focus on children). 
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Consequences of recognising rights 
Entitlement: Recognising rights in the context of 
humanitarian assistance means recognising people's 
entitlement to assistance. NGOs adopting a human rights 
framework will need to develop ways of enabling people to 
realise their rights and claim them. This is no easy matter in 
an emergency context. It involves: 
establishing mechanisms that people can use to activate 
an international response; 
concentrating more on enabling people to claim specific 
rights (eg, to food); and 
devising means by which NGOs can be held accountable 
to people seeking to exercise their rights. 
To be more than rhetorical in their acceptance of rights NGOs 
should measure their progress in terms of the actual realisation 
of specific human rights. NGOs could, for example, frame 
their 'critical indicators' of progress around the question: what 
human rights and whose human rights have been advanced 
by the intervention? NGOs which are serious about these 
matters will simply have to be more sensitive to the wishes of 
beneficiaries. Emergencies are often taken as opportunities 
to do things over people's heads, with no consultation 
whatsoever. 
Contingency planning: NGOs operating in complex 
emergencies should include a contingency that they (or their 
partner NGO) may have to put programmes at risk by publicly 
condemning human rights abuses. In so doing the NGO would 
have to determine precisely what it would feel constrained to 
protest about and at what level. This amounts to drafting a 
human rights strategy for the complex emergency in question, 
including guidelines for field staff. Non operational NGOs 
should at least be alert to the need for such a strategy and ask 
their operational partners for one. Apart from the practical 
planning need for such strategies, they are a necessary 
consequence of adopting an overall human rights mandate. 
But is this sound policy? Human Rights Watch has argued 
that 'being consistent about human rights principles and 
opposing all forms of blackmail will lead to improvements in 
thelongerterm' (quotedinMacraeandZwi 1994). Similarly, 
de Waal (1994:36) argues that: 'in the long term, more people 
will remain alive under more tolerable conditions if 
humanitarian relief is provided in a way that is consistent 
with basic human rights.' Surely this is true. The immediate 
difficulty for NGOs is coordination. Each NGO will fear 
that if they are the only one to stand on principle they will 
forfeit their role to other NGOs which see no necessary 
connection between 'humanitarian' and 'human rights'. 
Operational issues 
Working with UN agencies: The current paradigm seems to 
be a UN lead operation with NGOs taking on specific tasks 
(frequently as subcontractors). Working under the umbrella 
of a UN operation provides, at least potentially, a means of 
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coordinating action and gaining some leverage over the 
warring parties. But there is a down side: it can also bring 
NGOs under the discipline of rules negotiated between the 
UN and· warring parties, making NGO operations subject to 
their agreement. In other words, NGOs can become locked 
in and compromised by local and international realpolitik. 
NGOs can also find themselves gagged from certain types of 
comment, including criticism of a UN agency's failure to 
address human rights abuses. 
Another potential weakness of UN lead operations is the 
divided nature of the UN itself, which can manifest itself as 
operational competition between UNHCR, UNICEF or the 
World Food Programme, or between civilian and military 
components of a UN operation. A UN agency might even 
work against itself, as in the case of Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS) where UNICEF/OLS in Khartoum deliberately played 
a non confrontational role in relation to the Government of 
Sudan's human rights violations. The UN tends to develop 
operational structures which reinforce sovereignty, and the 
capital city headquarters tend to be unduly influenced by the 
government (eg, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 
UNTAC, was effectively captured by the State of Cambodia 
government in Phnom Penh and could not accept contrary 
views being put to it by some of its Military Observers deep 
in the field). 
Another shortcoming of the UN is that it does not provide a 
policy framework or guidelines for NGOs on how they should 
relate to warring parties and their 'civilian' structures. This 
is particularly true of structures put in place by rebel forces. 
Another problem is that when the UN establishes a working 
relationship with a rebel force, generally with the relief wing 
of that force, it tends to become locked into the relationship 
despite NGO protests that those bodies have become 
dysfunctional and part of the problem ( eg, the Sudan Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association). So despite the very great 
value of coordinated operations NGOs should not rely on the 
UN for ultimate guidance. NGOs must develop their own 
political compass in cooperation with other NGOs in similar 
circumstances. 
Human rights conditionality: Should international assistance 
be made conditional on respect for human rights? Ideally 
yes, but it could never be an effective substitute for 
interventions aimed directly at a resolution of the political 
crisis. Moreover, it would only be feasible to attempt to tie 
aid to respect for human rights if monitors were deployed to 
provide the information on which to act. The governments 
concerned will usually strongly oppose the deployment of 
monitors. Even if the government acquiesced, as in the case 
of Rwanda, there remains the problem of adequately 
resourcing monitors (NGOs could consider directing funds 
into this area). Another possibility is the use of the military 
as human rights monitors. Military Observers appeared to 
be the most effective of the UNTAC components in Cambodia. 
The difference with the other components (CIVPOL and the 
various national battalions like DutchBat) was their 
experience. They were generally Lieutenant-Colonel rank 
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or equivalent, with previous experience in blue beret 
operations (Cyprus, Palestine, etc.). Military Observers are 
unarmed and generally relate directly to the Liaison Officers 
of armed groups. 
Partners for peace: NGOs can play an important role in 
helping to facilitate and strengthen peace efforts at the 
community level. This is where NGOs have traditionally had 
distinct competencies. It is, of course, no easy matter to 
identify partners for peace. Everyone in authority seems to 
be compromised, organised groups tend to reflect local 
political interests, civil administrators tend to be weak, 
churches and mosques frequently fail to stand up for the poor 
and so on. Moreover, it can appear as though everyone is 
caught up in the conflict and accepts its necessity. 
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